Poland’s maritime security is decided today on a body of water which, after NATO’s enlargement to include Finland and Sweden, is surrounded by allied states yet remains a line of direct contact with Russia. The Baltic is a closed and shallow sea. There are no depths here for a submarine to hide in, and no distance to buy time for a reaction. Every action takes place in full view of everyone and within everyone’s reach.
Fleet modernisation is the first thread of this conversation: the frigate, submarine and mine-hunter programmes, the realism of their schedules, industry’s ability to keep them, and how to fill the capability gap in the transition period. Just as important is what these programmes lack, and the proportion between large platforms and dispersed, unmanned systems.
We discuss the threat spectrum in full: from the classic — mines, submarines and anti-access systems — to grey-zone operations aimed at critical infrastructure. Damage to power and telecommunications cables has shown that the most likely scenario is not war but continuous harassment below the threshold of armed response, which requires a separate answer — including a legal one.
The role of cooperation with allies, NATO standing groups and unmanned systems that allow presence at sea to be maintained with limited resources is growing accordingly. The question this panel is meant to answer most concretely remains: how to build a fleet genuinely capable of deterrence and defence in the coming years — not in a perspective in which all the programmes are already complete.